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Abstract 
We consider a situation of full insurance coverage for prescription drugs where, at a certain 
point in time, people are given the opportunity to take a deductible in exchange for a lower 
premium. Four determinants of this premium reduction can be considered: expected out-of- 
pocket payments, adverse selection effects, moral hazard effects, and administration costs. 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the first two determinants. Survey data of 17 242 in- 
sureds in the Netherlands have been used for this research. Results show that the expected 
out-of-pocket expenditures in case of a certain deductible amount depend strongly on age and 
gender. People in poor health could be given a larger premium discount if they would take 
a deductible than those in good health. This implies that a uniform premium discount would 
induce adverse selection. The effects of such selection have been simulated by using a survey 
question about the preference to take a general deductible. If the premium reductions for 
policies with a deductible are adjusted for age and gender, the selection effect will halve but 
will still be substantial. We conclude that, in the situation considered here, it is largely immate- 
rial whether deductibles are compulsory or voluntary, provided premium reductions are 
allowed to depend on relevant risk factors. 
Keywords: Deductibles; Prescription drugs; Out-of-pocket expenditures; Adverse selection 
1. Introductioll 
Recently in many countries health care reforms have been proposed or im- 
plemented in order to improve efficiency in health care. As an element of the Dutch 
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health care reforms, prescription drugs are completely covered for the whole popula- 
tion by the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) since January 1, 1992. The 
premium for the AWBZ is largely income related. In addition each person pays a 
small premium that is independent of risk. In the Netherlands the increasing costs 
of prescription drugs are a major concern for the Department of Health. In order 
to control costs, the introduction of a limited deductible for prescription drugs has 
been proposed by the government. 
In the case of a deductible insureds have to pay the costs of drugs themselves up 
to the deductible amount. Drug costs above that specific deductible amount are paid 
by the insurer. One of the major policy issues concerning the introduction of deduc- 
tibles is whether these should be either compulsory or voluntary. In this article we 
will deal with this question. 
In case of a deductible the insured will pay a lower premium. Generally speaking, 
four determinants of the premium reduction can be considered in case of a voluntary 
deductible: (1) expected out-of-pocket payments, (2) moral hazard effects, (3) ad- 
verse selection effects, and (4) administration costs. In the case of a compulsory de- 
ductible the third component is not relevant. 
From the insurer’s point of view out-of-pocket payments form avoided costs. The 
expected amount of out-of-pocket expenses depends on the risk the insured 
represents. Given a certain deductible amount, high risks (those in poor health) will 
have higher out-of-pocket expenditures than low risks (healthy). Therefore, high 
risks could be given a higher premium discount in the case of a deductible. It has 
yet to be decided whether the premium discounts will be allowed to be risk-related. 
This is an important choice between either high risks receiving a larger premium dis- 
count as a compensation for their higher expected out-of-pocket expenditures, or 
high risks in fact subsidizing low risks as a consequence of the uniform premium dis- 
count. This cross subsidization can be sustained only by means of regulation of the 
premium discount. 
The second determinant of the premium reduction is the effect of moral hazard 
[l-7]. This is the effect of insurance by which people consume more than they would 
do without insurance because they do not have to pay all costs themselves. The third 
determinant, (the effects of) adverse selection, is the tendency of high risks to be 
more likely to buy insurance or to buy larger amounts than low risks [8-lo]. In gen- 
eral the healthy will take a deductible [l 1). Adverse selection may cause a com- 
petitive insurance market to be unstable [12]. If selection effects are not taken into 
account when premium discounts are calculated, the discounts for those who take 
a deductible will be too large because these are in general the low risks. In that case, 
insurers will make a loss on the deductible policies: the premium reduction will on 
average be larger than the out-of-pocket payments. This may start a downward 
premium reduction spiral so that in the end the premium reduction will be zero, be- 
cause at every level of the premium discount the group of relatively good risks that 
will conclude the policy with a deductible is getting smaller and more selective 
[ 13,141. However, with a hypothetical premium reduction of zero, the same situation 
is achieved as the current, i.e. complete coverage. 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the expected out-of-pocket expenditures 
F. M. Bakker, R. C. J. A. van Vliet /Health Policv 31 ( 1995) 53-65 55 
and adverse selection effects as a result of the introduction of deductibles for costs 
of prescribed drugs in a situation of full coverage like the present Dutch AWBZ. We 
will concentrate on two questions: ‘Should the premium reductions be risk-related 
or uniform?’ and ‘Is it possible to safeguard insurers against adverse selection effects 
in the case of voluntary deductibles ?‘. Furthermore, the expected out-of-pocket ex- 
penses in the case of compulsory and voluntary deductibles will be compared. 
In section 2 we describe the data and methods. The results are presented in section 
3. Firstly, we discuss the issue of the introduction of a compulsory deductible, i.e. 
the case where adverse selection effects are absent because everybody is subjected to 
a deductible. Secondly, selection effects are analysed in the case of voluntary deduc- 
tibles. These effects are presented in general and per age/gender group. In section 
4 the policy relevance is discussed. Finally, in section 5 conclusions are drawn. 
2. Data and methods 
in this study, survey data of 17 242 insureds of a large private health insurance 
organization in the Netherlands were used. The survey, held in 1976, contained ques- 
tions about: money spent on pharmaceuticals prescribed by general practitioners 
(GPs) and specialists, the preference to take a general deductible, health status, and 
socio-economic characteristics. Adjustments were applied to make all insureds com- 
parable with respect to their insurance coverage, to transform drug costs data from 
6 to 12 months, and to account for inflation’. Ultimately, the data analysed can be 
considered as an approximation of 1993 expenditure data on drugs prescribed by 
GPs and specialists. Over-the-counter drugs are not included because these are not 
covered by the AWBZ. 
The two-part model [3] is used to estimate the expected out-of-pocket payments. 
The first part of the model is an analysis of the probability of drug use by means 
of a probit equation. The second part is an analysis of the logarithm of the non-zero 
drug expenditures via a linear regression. Subsequently, a mathematical approach is 
used to calculate for a number of deductible amounts the expected amount of drug 
costs for the insurer and the expected out-of-pocket expenses for the insured. This 
approach is an adaptation of Klugman [IS] and is described in the Appendix. 
3. Results 
Firstly, we will discuss the case of the introduction of a compulsory deductible (i.e. 
the case where adverse selection is not possible) in a situation of full coverage. The 
resulting expected out-of-pocket expenses are the basis for premium discounts. 
Secondly, selection effects are presented in the case of the introduction of voluntary 
deductibles. 
’ A statistical description of the drug costs data adjustments is available from the authors. 
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3. I. Compulsory deductibles 
Fig. 1 shows the expected out-of-pocket expenditures (premium discounts) averag- 
ed over the entire sample as a consequence of the introduction of a compulsory de- 
ductible starting from full coverage. The average costs of drugs prescribed by GPs 
and specialists are Dfl308 (= 175 USD, August 1994). Of course with an infinite de- 
ductible amount (i.e. no coverage at all) the average out-of-pocket expenditures 
equal the premium for an insurance policy without deductible, i.e. Dfl 308, ignoring 
loading fees. 
With a compulsory deductible of Dfl 100 the expected out-of-pocket expenditures 
are Dfl 53 per individual. This implies that the premium could be reduced from Dfl 
308 to Dfl 255 (= 308 - 53). The expected drug costs above the deductible of Dfl 
100 are thus Dfl 255, which are for account of the insurer. For larger deductible 
amounts the premium discount will be larger by a decreasing rate. 
To this point we have considered only compulsory deductibles with a uniform 
premium discount. But what are the consequences for men versus women, for exam- 
ple? The expected drug costs differ per gender. On average women have about 46% 
higher costs than men (Dfl 367 vs. Dfl 251). With a compulsory deductible of Dfl 
500, women will have expected out-of-pocket payments of Dfl 188 and men of Dfl 
140. Without a differentiation according to gender the expected out-of-pocket 
payments are Dfl 163 (Fig. 1). So, the introduction of a compulsory deductible of 
Dfl 500 with a uniform premium reduction of Dfl 163 would result in an expected 
advantage of Dfl 23 for men (= premium reduction minus expected out-of-pocket 
expenses = 163 - 140) and an expected disadvantage of Dfl25 for women (163-188). 
From the insurer’s point of view, insuring a male generates an expected loss of Dfl 
23, while insuring a female generates an expected contribution to profit of Dfl 25. 
With larger deductible amounts these differences will increase further. Thus, the con- 
expected out-of-pocket payments, in Dfl of 1993 
250 F--- - 
1 
~0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000 
deductible 
Fig. 1. The expected out-of-pocket payments per compulsory deductible. 
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sequence of such a rigid premium structure would be that women would have higher 
out-of-pocket payments than men which are not compensated by higher premium 
discounts. This constitutes an incentive for risk selection in the case of voluntary 
deductibles. 
Another obvious distinction is a differentiation according to age. Table 1 shows 
that drug costs are strongly related to age. People above the age of 40 have higher 
costs than average. The same holds for their expected out-of-pocket expenses in case 
of a deductible. In comparison with a uniform premium reduction, individuals up 
to 40 years of age, with less than average out-of-pocket expenses, will have a disad- 
vantage if the premium reductions are age-related. Finally, the expected out-of- 
pocket expenditures per age/gender category in case of a compulsory deductible of 
Dfl 500 are depicted in Fig. 2. It shows clearly that, from an actuarial point of view, 
the premium discount should increase with age. Generally, the same argument ap- 
plies for people in poor health. 
Other arguments may be involved when insurers determine their premium reduc- 
tions. For example: are there possibilities to attract good risks? In this manner ad- 
verse selection [16] might take place on the basis of different expected costs above 
the deductible amount or it might take the form of attracting people with low costs 
Table I 
Expected costs above and below a compulsory deductible 
Age Deductible 
0 100 250 500 loo0 
Expected costs above o-9 140 92 55 29 II 
deductible (insured) IO-19 99 61 42 23 10 
20-29 207 I56 108 66 32 
30-39 235 181 128 80 39 
40-49 348 289 223 I55 87 
50-59 501 437 360 271 I71 
60-69 761 692 601 486 339 
70-79 862 787 687 557 390 
80+ 1014 931 819 671 476 
Average 308 255 200 
Expected costs below 
deductible (insurer) 
o-9 
IO-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
80+ 
48 85 
32 57 
51 99 
54 108 
59 126 
64 141 
69 I60 
15 175 
83 I95 
I44 88 
Ill 128 
76 89 
I40 175 
156 196 
194 261 
230 329 
275 422 
304 471 
343 538 
Average 0 53 108 163 220 
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expected out-of-pocket expenses, in Dfl of 1993 
o-9 lo-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+ 
am 
Fig. 2. Expected out-of-pocket expenses per age/gender category: a compulsory deductible of Dfi N@ 
for other kinds of health care. In this case insurers may opt to give low risks (healthy 
people) a higher than actuarially fair premium reduction when they take a deduct- 
ible, while the high risks would receive a lower than actuarially fair premium reduc- 
tion. This would attract low risks and repulse high risks. 
3.2. Voluntary deductibles 
With a voluntary deductible, adverse selection could become a problem. In this 
study selection effects are inferred from the survey question about the preference for 
a general deductible. We assumed that this question could be seen as a proxy for se- 
lection. Some limitations can be mentioned. First, it is the answer to a survey ques- 
tion and not a real choice. Second, the question read: ‘Would you like to have a 
health insurance plan with a deductible if you would get an appropriate premium 
reduction?‘. Therefore, the answers should be interpreted as an indication whether 
one generally liked the idea of a deductible because a specific deductible amount and 
premium reduction are not mentioned. So, for every hypothetical deductible 
amount, we assumed the same selection effects. Furthermore, the survey question 
was only asked at the family level, i.e. the situation in which the deductible relates 
to all family members. Therefore, the head of the household and his/her partner and 
children had the same derived answer. In the case of individual deductibles, selection 
effects can be expected to be larger than with family deductibles because family 
policies are a form of risk-pooling [ 171. Finally the question referred to a general de- 
ductible and not a drug-specific one. Maybe individuals can predict their drug costs 
better than their total health care costs and thus selection effects will be larger with 
a deductible for drugs only. For these reasons the results of our simulation analyses 
should be viewed as indications of the problems that are likely to arise when volun- 
tary deductibles are introduced in a situation of complete coverage. 
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About half the policy holders answered the question about the general deductible 
in the affirmative. As expected, persons that do not want a deductible have substan- 
tially higher costs: Dfl 386 vs. Df1222 (deductible group). We define the adverse se- 
lection effect as the difference between the average total drug costs of the 
no-deductible group and the deductible group. In this definition selection is not 
based on the difference in expected out-of-pocket payments between the two groups 
because this difference depends on the deductible amount. In this case the selection 
effect is Dfl 164 (= 386 - 222). In relative terms this is 53% (= 164/308 x 100%) of 
the overall mean costs. 
If insurers would not take adverse selection effects into account, the premium dis- 
counts can be based on the overall expected out-of-pocket expenditures. Then the 
insurers would soon discover that these premium discounts are too high as a conse- 
quence of selection. Actually, with a deductible of Dfl 500, the premium discount 
should be Dfl 136 instead of Dfl 163 [the expected out-of-pocket expenses of the 
deductible-group (see Fig. 3) instead of the expected out-of-pocket expenses in the 
case of a compulsory deductible of Dfl 500, i.e. without risk selection effects]. So, 
next year insurers will offer a premium reduction of for example Dfl 136. If in- 
dividuals have the choice each year whether to take a deductible, then the relatively 
high risks who originally would have chosen a deductible of Dfl500 with a premium 
reduction of Dfl 163, will opt for full coverage if the premium reduction is lowered 
to Dfl 136. The same argument can be repeated for the following years, which 
ultimately might result in a premium reduction of zero. 
For a risk-neutral individual the policy choice results from comparing the 
premium reduction with the expected out-of-pocket expenses. However, we could 
not simulate this dynamic process because we do not know in which way insureds 
will make their choice in reality, i.e. with specific deductible amounts and premium 
discounts. So, all results with regard to adverse selection effects are based on the 
once-only survey question and are consequently hypothetical. 
expected costs deductible group, in Dfl of 1993 
too 
1~ * above deductible w below 
100 200 300 400-- 500 600 700 800 900 1,000 
deductible 
Fig. 3. Expected costs above and below deductible, with selection. Note: total expected costs deductible 
group Dfl 222; no deductible group, Dfl 386. 
60 F.M. Bakker, R.C.J.A. van Vliet / Health Policy 31 (1995) 53-65 
If the premium discounts are differentiated according to gender, the adverse selec- 
tion effects still remain substantial. For men the difference in drug costs between the 
no-deductible and deductible group is Dfl 136 (= 318 - 182) or 54% (136/251 x 
100%). For women these figures are Dfl 188 (= 454 - 266) and 51% 
(1881367 x lOO%), respectively. Perhaps the reason for this small decline is the mea- 
surement method: the survey question referred to a family deductible and not to an 
individual deductible, so, in spite of different expected drug costs for men and 
women, the derived answer on the survey question is the same for male and female 
belonging to the same family. 
Table 2 presents the adverse selection effects with regard to age categories. This 
table contains the expected costs in general as well as for the no-deductible and de- 
ductible groups. The differentiation according to age results in a substantial decline 
of the selection effect. In money terms this effect reduces from Dfl 164 to Dfl 79 
(figures weighted with the number of insureds per age category). This reduction is 
achieved because relatively many young insureds have expressed a preference for a 
deductible. It remains to be seen if the same pattern can be recognised in a situation 
when the premium reductions are age-related. Finally, the expected out-of-pocket 
expenditures for a deductible of Dfl 500 per age/gender are depicted in Fig. 4. Of 
course the expected out-of-pocket expenses for people who do not want a deductible 
are only hypothetical. Thus, these simulated expenses have to be understood as if 
the no-deductible group would still be obligated to take a deductible of Dfl 500 too. 
The interaction between age and gender results in a further decrease of the relative 
risk selection effect to 23%. This percentage is the mean (weighted by number of in- 
sureds) selection effect percentages of the 18 age/gender groups. The selection effect 
is still substantial and probably would have been even bigger had the survey question 
referred to the individual level instead of family level and specifically to drug costs 
instead of total health care costs. 
4. Policy relevance 
In the Netherlands prescribed drugs are completely covered for the whole popula- 
tion by the AWBZ (Exceptional Medical Expenses Act). In order to control costs, 
the introduction of a deductible for prescription drugs has been proposed by the 
Table 2 
Drug costs per age category, with selection 
Age group 
Average drug costs 
No-deductible group 
Deductible group 
Selection effect (Dfl) 
Selection effect O/u” 
o-9 IO-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+ 
140 99 207 235 348 501 761 862 1014 
I59 II2 227 268 399 559 808 894 1036 
124 88 182 208 293 415 636 706 876 
35 24 45 60 106 I44 172 I88 160 
25 24 22 26 30 29 23 22 I6 
“As a percentage of average costs per age group. 
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expected out-of-pocket expenses, in Dfl of 1993 
400 r~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ 
-~ r”RlP no ded ih”P 1 
‘x “?RlC dPdL!CI~bk 
OL .----------- I 
o-9 1 O-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-1 
Fig. 4. Expected amount of out-of-pocket expenses: deductible/no-deductible group per age/gender 
(hypothetical deductible of Dfl500). Note: the expected out of pocket expenses of the no-deductible group 
are hypothetical. 
government. Several issues have to be decided upon, e.g. whether deductibles should 
be compulsory or voluntary, whether supplemental insurance should be allowed in 
case of a compulsory deductible, and whether premium reductions offered by in- 
surers may be risk-related. Here we consider the possible premium reductions in case 
of a deductible of Dfl 500. 
4.1. Compulsory deductible (Djl500) 
Option 1 is the case of a uniform premium reduction of Dfl 163 (independent of 
risk). The consequences are that young people (<30 years old) will have expected 
out-of-pocket expenses of about Dfl 100 and people of 60+ years old of about Dfl 
300 (see Fig. 2). For a diabetic the out-of-pocket expenses will be very often Dfl500. 
This raises questions about fairness [ 18,191. Option 2 with a compulsory deductible 
is risk-related premium reductions. For example with a differentiation only accor- 
ding to age the possible premium reductions can in principle be the same as the ex- 
pected out-of-pocket expenses (see Table 1). With completely risk-related reductions 
a diabetic should receive a premium discount of nearly Dfl 500 in the case of a de- 
ductible of Dfl 500. So, an important choice that the government has to make is 
whether or not to allow risk-related premium reductions, and if so, on which risk 
factors the premium reductions may depend. 
If supplemental insurance is allowed, selection might take place for the sup- 
plemental insurance with a uniform premium. This may cause an upward premium 
spiral so that in the end the premium for the supplemental insurance will be Dfl500. 
A risk-related premium for the supplemental insurance may prevent this selection 
effect to occur. 
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4.2. Voluntary deductible (Djl500) 
The options are the same as with a compulsory deductible. First we consider the 
same premium reduction for everyone. Adverse selection will result in premium 
reductions that are lower than the overall expected out-of-pocket expenses, because 
in general only the good risks will choose a deductible. However, this may cause a 
downward premium reduction spiral so that in the end the premium reduction will 
be zero, because at every premium discount level the relatively bad risks will not con- 
clude the policy with a deductible. Option 2 is risk-related premium reductions. If 
the government allows the insurers to differentiate the premium reductions, then a 
diabetic can receive a premium discount of Dfl 500 and a very healthy young man 
Dfl 50 for example. Then, everyone has a real choice whether or not to take a de- 
ductible. 
So, if the government wants a compulsory deductible for prescribed drugs, then 
the premium reductions should be risk-related to compensate for the different ex- 
pected out-of-pocket expenses per individual. In the case of voluntary deductibles 
the same argument about fairness can be mentioned. Besides, risk-related premium 
reductions safeguard insurers against the effects of selection. 
5. Conclusion 
In this study we analysed the expected out-of-pocket expenditures and adverse se- 
lection effects as a result of the introduction of deductibles for costs of prescribed 
drugs in a situation of full coverage. For the estimation of the adverse selection ef- 
fects in case of deductibles for drug costs we used survey data on drug expenditures 
and on the preference for a general deductible. The data on drug expenditures used 
were corrected for differences in insurance coverage, were transformed from half- 
year data to l-year data, and a correction for inflation was applied. The answers to 
the survey question about a deductible is interpreted as an indication whether one 
generally liked the idea of a deductible. This question was only asked at the family 
level, i.e. the situation in which the deductible relates to all family members, and it 
referred to a general deductible and not a drug-specific one. 
For these reasons the results of our analyses should be viewed as an indication 
of the problems that are likely to arise when compulsory/voluntary deductibles with 
uniform/risk-related premium discounts are introduced in a situation of complete 
coverage. 
Total drug costs are strongly related to age. Above the age of 20 drug costs 
increase approximately linear. People in the age category 50-59 have costs that are 
on average about twice as high as those in the age group of 30-39. Furthermore 
women have higher mean costs than men. The age group of 20-39 shows a gender 
difference in drug costs of a factor 2. Of course these differences in drug costs have 
implications for the expected out-of-pocket expenditures in case of a deductible. 
With a compulsory deductible and a uniform premium reduction the elderly (and 
unhealthy) have a disadvantage: in general the premium reduction is not big enough 
to compensate the expected out-of-pocket expenses. 
With voluntary deductibles a large difference in average drug costs has been found 
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between persons who prefer a deductible and those who do not want a deductible, 
namely Dfl 222 for the deductible group and Dfl 386 for the no-deductible group. 
We defined the relative adverse selection effect as the difference between the ex- 
pected average drug costs of the no-deductible and deductible groups divided by the 
average drug costs of both groups together. After correction for age/gender the selec- 
tion effect reduces from about 0.53 to 0.23. This still seems substantial and it remains 
to be seen if this will be sufficient to prevent risk selection. However with other 
characteristics (for example health status variables) the selection effect should reduce 
further. 
In practice, people may not often change from the no-deductible group to the de- 
ductible group and vice versa because of material and immaterial transaction costs. 
Further, insurers could introduce a waiting period for switching to another in- 
surance policy. This will protect them somewhat against calculated behaviour for 
planned or easily foreseen drug costs. 
In conclusion, we found that when deductibles are introduced in a situation of full 
coverage, an age/gender-related premium discount structure will give a more stable 
insurance market than a uniform premium discount. As this holds for both com- 
pulsory and voluntary deductibles, the important choice for the politicians should 
be between uniform and risk-related premium discounts, and not so much between 
compulsory and voluntary. 
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The statistical method used for the calculation of the expected out-of-pocket 
expenses is the two-part model. First some variables are introduced: 
Y = drug costs (individual) 
P( Y > 0) = probability of non-zero drug costs 
Y’ = YIY>O 
Y ifYld 
ydl = 
d ifY>d 
= drug costs below the deductible (dl) 
0 ifYrd 
ydl = 
Y-d ifY>d 
= drug costs below the deductible (dt) 
Y = ydl + ydl 
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The expected values of Y, Ydlr and Y,, are: 
E(r) = P(Y > 0) x E(Y) 
E( ydd = E(r) - E(ydl), 
with E( Yd,) = P(Y > 0) x P(Y’ > d) x [E(Y’ 
OrE(Yd,) = P(Y> 0) X dlm(J”-d) X f(J 
I Y' > d)-d] 
“)SJJ’ 
= E(Y) - P(Y > 0) x (d j = y’ Xf~‘)@‘+ d X [I-F(d)]]. 
So far, no assumptions are made about the distribution. Assuming - as is custom- 
ary in analyses of health care expenditures - that Y’ has a lognormal distribution 
with parameters p and u, gives the following derivations: 
E(r) = P( Y > 0) x exp(j.4 + 0.5~~) 
E(ydd = E(r) - E(ydt), 
with: E( Yd,) = E(Y) x [l - cP(c - u)] - P( Y > 0) X d x [ 1 - a(c)], 
where c = [log(d) - k]Iu and Cp the cumulative standard normal distribution 
function. 
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